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Summary of Vaccination and Disease Eradication: A Dynamic 
Analysis 
 
This paper analyzes the conditions for eradication of diseases in a static and 
dynamic framework. In static framework, it investigates whether it is possible to 
eradicate diseases. There has been controversy in the public health research as 
to the possibility of eradication of diseases. Although epidemiologists have 
always felt that eradication of disease possible, there has been suspect among 
economists.  A representative view of the suspect has been reported in the Hand 
Book of Health economics as “…although the introduction of a vaccine usually 
produces a sharp drop in the occurrence of a disease, the eradication of vaccine 
preventable diseases predicted by many at the time of these inventions has not been 
achieved except for smallpox. Of the roughly forty vaccines on the market, only the 
smallpox vaccine has eradicated its target disease. Diseases … persist, despite explicit 
governmental efforts to eradicate them, and recent attempts to develop a vaccine 
against HIV or AIDS raise important questions about the causes behind these 
difficulties…” Revisiting the economics behind possibility of disease eradication in static 
framework, it seems that given the necessary economic incentives are fulfilled, in 
contrast to some of the recent literature; the results imply that it is possible to 
eradicate diseases, at least those whose dynamics follows Susceptible-Infective-
Recovery, SIR framework.  Individuals choose the level of vaccination that 
ensures eradication if the full cost of the vaccine that accrue to the individual is 
subsidized.  
 
By expanding the framework to dynamic analysis, in the SIR models of infectious 
diseases, it tries to see whether there is biological limitation to eradication of 
infectious diseases. The canonical model of human disease dynamics imply that 
given certain critical level of vaccination is satisfied, it is possible to eradicate 
diseases. Given biological conditions are met and economic incentives are 
satisfied, unlike the suspect of some economists, it is possible to eradicate 
diseases.  
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Knowing that it is possible to eradicate infectious diseases, the social planner 
may resort to various public health policies including doing nothing, controlling, 
eliminating, eradicating or extinctions of diseases. But in order to make the 
choice of policies simpler, this paper considers two policies, namely doing 
nothing versus eradication, and considers them in their extreme version in light of 
economic benefits. It compares whether eradicating as fast as possible is 
preferable to doing nothing. The ultimate comparison involves choosing between 
the discounted cost of infection if the disease is left uninterrupted by deliberate 
policy measures and the discounted cost eradicating the disease as fast as 
possible.  In relation to economic optimality, it has been shown that, in the 
limiting case where the ratio of terminal to initial infection approaches zero, 
eradicating as fast as possible is preferred to doing nothing when the discounted 
cost of infection of the fraction of initial population infected is greater than the unit 
cost of vaccination. 
 
Depending on the parametric values, some diseases could be candidate for 
eradication and others may not be. Especially it seems that the cost benefit rule 
looks more sensitive to the ratio of the maximum fraction of infected people in 
which the disease can’t expand to the equilibrium fraction of infected people if the 
disease is left uninterrupted.   The cost benefit rule suggests fewer diseases to 
be eradicated as the ratio of terminal rate of infection to initial rate of infection 
approaches zero. In this regard the paper is in center view of epidemiologists that 
suggest eradication of most diseases and suspicious economists that suggest 
diverting our attention fully from eradication.  
 
Finally, there has been some effort committed to see whether the current global 
action to eradicate polio is economically preferable. The results that follow from 
the cost benefit rule suggest that eradicating polio even using oral live-attenuated 
polio vaccine [OPV] is not optimal in both rich and poor countries. 
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I. Introduction and Background of the Research 
Human diseases have long been on earth nearly as much as humanity. Like any 
other bad social outcomes, they have been more concentrated in poor nations 
especially in the tropics. The 1997 WHO world report pointed out that in 1996 
alone, there were around 14 million deaths caused by infectious diseases only. It 
has also been noted by the report that infectious diseases are the primary 
causes of worldwide death. About two deaths out of four in poor countries are 
caused by infectious diseases. Lederberg (2003) pointed out that measles alone 
causes 900,000 deaths worldwide each year on average, which is 30% of the 
total death from vaccine preventable diseases. Due to AIDS, about 3 million 
individuals had lost their lives by 2004, and another 40 million people were living 
with the disease throughout the world1.  AIDS has left shambling economies and 
a large number of orphans to the extent that the social mechanism is unable to 
bear in the near future.   
 
According to Diamond (1998), diseases have shaped the historical paths in 
which different nations evolved into where they are now. Historically there have 
been a number of attempts to have the world free of diseases though success 
has been much farther away from our site.  Alternatively, extensive efforts have 
been devoted to control, elimination, and eradication of feasible diseases at least 
since the Dahlem’s International Workshop on infectious diseases2.  
 
Previous researches in health economics established the view that eradication of 
disease is neither feasible nor optimal. However, such a view has been revised 
by recent researches. Recent researches have established that there are cases 
for eradication, if feasible, to be optimal in static framework. As will be discussed 
in next sections, eradication involves higher short run cost and everlasting long 
run pie, while control of diseases involves persistent costs. Eradication, if 
                                                      
1  http://www.avert.org/worldstats.htm 
 
2  See Dowdle (1998) for instance. 
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biologically and operationally feasible, involves higher “dividend” compared with 
persistence high control. Hence, the prime motivation for the research is to 
investigate whether there is a case for feasibility of eradication, followed by the 
questions “under what conditions eradication is cost effective health policy?” 
 
Public health policies have all been in the center of academic discussion. 
Depending on the nature of diseases, nations may resort to do nothing, control, 
eliminate, or eradicate diseases using treatment, sanitations, and vaccination. In 
simple SIR model of disease dynamics, individual decision to buy the level of 
protective measures that ensures control or eradication depends on its full cost. 
Under positive cost of vaccination, individuals have incentive to demand the level 
of vaccination so that the proportion of vaccinated people is below the critical 
level that eradicates the disease. On the other hand, if the whole cost of 
vaccination is subsidized, the proportion of people vaccinated matches with the 
necessary level of vaccination that eradicates the disease. 
 
In dynamic framework, quick eradication is preferred to doing nothing when 
welfare cost of infection is the critical value of the welfare cost of infection. The 
critical value of the welfare cost of infection is a decreasing function of the ratio of 
the initial fraction of infection to terminal fraction among other parameters. If 
eradication is preferred, there is unique time of eradication. It is given by the 
logarithm difference between initial fractions of infected people less the tipping 
point discounted by the aggregate rate of withdrawal from fraction of infected 
individuals. Testing for polio, the cost benefit rule derived here implies that 
eradication of polio is not economically optimal using OPV or inactivated polio 
vaccine, IPV. The cost benefit rule suggests smaller number of diseases to be 
eradicated than comparable researches in the literature.  
 
 The paper is organized as follows: The introduction section is followed by the 
section in which the possibility of disease eradication is revisited in a static 
framework. Then dynamic models of disease evolution are overviewed along 
 5 
different public health policies. Section four develops an alternative approach to 
the model forwarded by Barrett and Hoel (2004) [BH], and extracts results for 
economic optimality and applies the results of the model to the eradication 
attempt of polio. The final section pinpoints the limitations and possible ways of 
extending the analysis. 
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II. Is Eradication of Disease Possible? 
The previously held belief of epidemiologist about infectious diseases, 
particularly the possibility of disease eradication, has been shaken in late 1990s 
with series of papers in economic epidemiology. Philipson (2000) summarizes 
the literature on economic epidemiology. Economic epidemiology is a phrase 
associated with systematic study of the interaction between biological epidemics 
and human behavior to achieve social objective. The key variable in economic 
epidemiology is prevalence elasticity which is the response of people’s behavior 
due to changes in prevalence of diseases. Consideration of behavioral 
responsiveness would result in a number of distinct predictions concerning the 
incidence of diseases and its social cost than what the biological epidemiology 
suggests.  
 
A number of researches in economic epidemiology have investigated the 
appropriate policy responses to infectious diseases. The most relevant question 
to this paper that they addressed is “Is eradication of diseases possible and/or is 
optimal?” Geoffard and Philipson (1997) formally argued that eradication is 
neither optimal nor possible in feasible markets under any form of expectations. 
Forceful argument, claiming eradication is impossible even under price subsidies, 
was forwarded by Geoffard and Philipson (1997). 
 
 “...price subsidies alone will not bring about eradication for the same 
reasons that price reductions through increased competition will not...”3 
 
This argument goes counter to the crux and title of this paper. One is inclined to 
ask “if eradication is not possible, why do we bother about its optimality?” I will 
revisit, following Barrett (2003), the question on possibility of disease eradication 
                                                      
 3 Barrett (2003) showed that under competitive market structure with positive prices global 
eradication of diseases is not possible.   
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at least by using subsidies in static setting below. Latter, I will extend it to 
dynamic settings. 
 
I ignore the interaction between private agents in the market for vaccines and 
consider the decision as if taken by benevolent social planner that maximizes the 
benefit of the society taking into account all generations. The immediate 
implication of this assumption is that there is no difference between elimination 
and eradication in the analysis. Hence, the analysis in the rest of the paper is 
applicable to the world as a whole or to the last country making eradication 
decision after all other countries have eliminated the disease. 
 
 Although impossibility of eradication of diseases under positive price with private 
actions is robust, it is possible to eradicate a technically feasible disease with 
subsidies that cover the full cost of vaccine that accrue to individuals such as 
monetary cost of vaccination, the cost of time, pain, and the risk of getting 
infected from bad batch of vaccine. Given that the full cost of vaccine is covered, 
there is a possibility, as formally shown below for eradication to be feasible and 
optimal for an individual. 
 
Epidemiology 
For simplicity, I will assume the world as if ruled by a benevolent social planner. 
This assumption is a bit strong but it is a useful simplification to address the 
problem at hand. The relationship between the number of secondary infections, 
R, and proportion of people vaccinated,Nν  and the rate of secondary 
infections, 0R
4 is assuming homogenous mixing of population is given by (1).  
  
                                                      
4 It measures the average secondary infections when an infected person is introduced in to 
susceptible hosts.  For a disease to spread, it is essential that R0 > 1 as has been proved by 
many authors for instance Philipson (2000) or Hethcote (2000). Barrett (2003) reported R0=6 for 
polio. The value of R0  reported by Keeling (2001)  range from 2 – 5 for AIDS, 3 – 5 for Smallpox, 
16 – 18 for Measles, and more than 100 for Malaria. 
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 0(1 ) ..........R N Rν= − (1)5 
 
The proportion (1 )Nν−  represents the fraction of the population that is 
susceptible. Equation (1) says the number of secondary infections is equal to 
rate of secondary infections multiplied by the part of the population that is not 
immunized. We assume the vaccine ensures complete immunity and the disease 
is non-fatal. Then, it follows that for all diseases with 0 1R > the critical proportion 
of vaccination which ensures complete immunity is obtained when R=1 or 
smaller. 
 
0
11 ............cN
R
ν
= − (2) 
 
The implicit assumption here is that the disease dies out itself once we vaccinate 
cNν  proportion of people.  This may be due to herd immunity. By herd immunity 
we mean the immunity that individuals access without actually buying immunity 
services when other individuals have bought the immunity through vaccines or 
early accusation of disease. When some people demand immunity, the 
proportion of people infected decreases thereby decreasing the probability of 
getting infection for individuals. Gain in immunity that follows from such a positive 
externality due to decreased force of infections can be disease induced or 
vaccine induced. The herd immunity considered in this paper is induced by 
vaccine. Hethcote (2000) and Anderson and May (1991) reported estimates of 
cNν  for various diseases. For smallpox and polio, it is 0.80 while it is 0.86 for 
rubella, 0.89 for mups, .99 for malaria, P. falciparum in hyperendemic regions, 
and 0.94 for measles6. However, an infinitesimal decrease of fraction of people 
vaccinated from cNν  would result in the reemergence of the disease since the 
diseases we have considered have 0 1R > . 
                                                      
5  See Anderson and May (2001) & Barrett (2003) 
6  Alternatively, one can calculate Nvc from equation 2 using the rate of secondary infections. 
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Individual Decision 
Individuals make decisions to demand immunity by comparing the expected cost 
of immunity to that of the disease. An individual can obtain immunity in two 
different ways: by directly purchasing the vaccine or from herd immunity. Let all 
the costs of the vaccine that accrue to the individual be “c ”.  The cost function of   
buying immunity is given by:  
 
IC c= … … …… (3) 
 
On the other hand, if an individual doesn’t demand immunity then the expected 
cost of the disease is given by probability of acquiring the disease, which is the 
force of infection, times the total cost of infection. The force of infection is given 
by: 
 
( )0 cvc vR N Nλ β= − 7 : 0v c vcN N N∀ < ≤  and 0λ =  otherwise ……. (4) 
 
The value β  represents the transmission parameter, and the expected cost of 
disease is given by the product of the force of infection and the cost of infection, 
which is: 
 
( )0 ..............vc vdC b R b N Nλ β= = − (5) 
 
The value b is the total cost of infection that accrues to an 
individual :vc vc vN N N∀ ≥ . Individuals have incentive from buying immunity so 
long as I dC C≤ , while they have incentive to do nothing when I dC C≥ . The state 
of interior competitive equilibrium, here, is defined as the state where the 
individual is indifferent between doing nothing and taking preventive measures. It 
is a state where individuals have no incentive to deviate. The competitive 
                                                      
7 Anderson and May (2001) 
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equilibrium, after little algebra, is given by (6) where the fraction mNν is market 
induced proportion of population vaccinated. 
                                
0/ .............
m cN N c b Rν ν β= − (6) 
 
Under positive cost of vaccination the proportion of people vaccinated is below 
the tipping proportion which ensures full immunization. But, as long as the 
individual cost is zero, the proportion of individuals vaccinated equals the critical 
proportion which ensures complete immunity of the whole population for non-fatal 
diseases whose 0 1R >
8. 
 
In fact, Lederberg (2003) begins the summary and assessment of Dahlem’s 
international conference by pointing out that 
 
“ … The successful smallpox campaign demonstrates that global eradication of disease 
is possible, given the necessary technical base, political commitment, and economic 
resources for immunization and continued surveillance….” 
 
With subsidized cost of vaccination, the next question is whether it is optimal to 
do so at least from the perspective of benevolent social planner.  As described 
earlier, the social planner definitely incur higher cost in the short run by 
subsidizing full cost of vaccination so that the equality between critical proportion 
of vaccination and actual vaccination proportions is maintained.  However, as the 
disease disappears just after such a cost is incurred, there is a long run pie from 
reduced burden of disease which includes disease induced costs and distortions. 
It is then optimal, to eradicate a specific disease if its discounted pie is greater 
than the cost of eradication. In deed, Barrett (2003) has formally addressed this 
question. In this paper, I will consider the problem in a dynamic setting. 
                                                      
8 Given
[0, )c ∈ ∞
, 0
vc vmc N N= ⇒ =  ∧   
vm vcc N N+∀ ∈ ⇒ <R  
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 III. Dynamic Models of Infectious Diseases and Health Policies 
Overview of Dynamic Models 
Since the emergence of the first attempt by Daniel Bernoulli to formulate model 
for smallpox in 1760, modeling the dynamics of infectious diseases has been an 
important part of academic research. A number of models have been developed 
to describe and predict disease dynamics depending on the movement in to 
compartments of horizontal or vertical incidence.  
 
When mothers are infected by a given communicable disease, some IgG 
antibodies are transferred to her child through placenta, which would transfer 
temporary passive immunity to infection to the child. Let M be the infants with 
passive immunity. When the temporary antibodies disappear, the infants join the 
class of susceptible designated by S. Moreover, newborns without antibodies 
also constitute this class.  When there is a sufficient contact between an infected 
and susceptible, the disease transmits to the susceptible. With the transmission, 
a person joins exposed class E in the latent period. In this class, the person is 
infected but not infectious yet. When the latent period ends, the exposed enter 
the infective class I. Individuals in this class are not only infected but also 
transmit the disease to others given sufficient contacts are ensured. With the end 
of the infectious period, the individual enters recovered class R which includes 
those who gained permanent or temporary infection induced immunity. 
 
Based on disease compartments there are about ten different models of disease 
dynamics. They are MSEIR, MSEIRS, SEIR, SEIRS, SIR, SIRS, SEI, SEIS, SI, 
and SIS9.  For instance, the acronym SIR involves class of diseases in which 
Susceptible individuals are infected with adequate contact with the introduction of 
an infective person and gain permanent disease induced immunity in entering 
Recovered class, i.e. Susceptible →  Infected/infectious→  Recovery. On the 
other hand, the acronym SIS involves diseases in which individuals are 
                                                      
9 Again based on time, these models can be epidemic or endemic. 
 12
susceptible due to the gain in temporary infection-acquired immunity once they 
are infected i.e. Susceptible →  Infected/infectious→  Susceptible. The 
mathematical properties and essential results of most of these models are 
summarized by Hethcote (2000). Moreover, it was shown in the same paper that 
some of the most essential results of these models can be generated from the 
SIR model. In this paper, we exclusively focus on the simple SIR framework. 
Some of the examples of diseases whose dynamics was represented by SIR 
model are smallpox, influenza, chickenpox, polio, measles, and rubella. Let’s see 
the dynamics in SIR model in a little detail below. 
 
Dynamics in Endemic SIR Model 
Many papers have investigated the dynamics in canonical endemic SIR models. 
However, the purpose here is to review the dynamics and see the biological 
conditions for feasibility of disease eradication. In the endemic SIR model we first 
specify how fractions of susceptible, infected, and immune individuals evolve 
over time. 
 
The canonical SIR model, which is reported by Anderson and May (1991), 
provides simple picture of the dynamics of immunization in the epidemiology 
literature. The Model which we follow here is given by (7) and (8):  
 
[ ]( ) ( ) [ ( )] ( )............S t v t t S tψ ψ λ• = − − + (7)10 
 
Where S(t) is the proportion of the people that is susceptible, ( )tλ  is the rate at 
which susceptible individuals become infected, while (t) ν represents overall rate 
                                                      
10 We follow Barrett and Hoel (2003) in how we specify the dynamics when vaccination is 
introduced. We simply add the negative of the rate of vaccination into the differential equation of 
susceptible. This formulation is slightly different from some papers in the literature say Philipson 
(2000) or Andersen and May (1991). The difference is that in this model everyone of any age can 
be susceptible while in others it is only new births that do not demand immunity through 
vaccination that join the stock of susceptible.  For our task at hand, however, both formulations 
give qualitatively the same result. 
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of vaccination. We assume that the disease is non-lethal and population is 
constant in whichψ  refers to both death and birth rate.  
 
Equation (7) implies that change in the stock of susceptible is given by birth 
rateψ , increase in stock of susceptible, less withdrawal from the stock due to 
mortality, ψ S (t), less withdrawal to infective, (t)S(t) λ , minus the fraction of 
individuals that demand immunity through vaccination.   
 
The rate at which infected people immune from the non-lethal disease is given by 
δ  and R0 is the basic reproductive rate of the disease pathogen. The fraction of 
population infected under the control program ( )y t progress according to: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).............y t t S t y tλ δ ψ• = − + (8) 
 
The first term in the right hand side represents the entry to the infected and the 
second term represents the withdrawal from being infected either due to natural 
recovery or mortality. This implies that the net change in the stock of infected is 
the difference between the entry and the withdrawal to the group. Assuming 
homogeneous mixing, that is the rate of infection ( )tλ is proportional to the 
infected population under the control program; i.e. ( ) ( )t y tλ β= , where β  is 
transmission parameter, and defining basic reproductive rate of micro parasite 
based on type II survival11 by (9) the dynamics is provided by equations (7) and 
(8). 
 
( )0R
β
ψ δ= +  ……….. (9) 
( ) ( ( ), ( )) ( ) [ ( )] ( ).......S t f S t y t v t y t S tψ ψ β• = = − − + (10) 
                                                      
11 Andersen and May(1991) 
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( ) 0( ) ( ), ( ) ( )( ( ) 1) ( )y t g S t y t R S t y tδ ψ
•
= = + − ....... (11) 
 
Steady state requires both the time derivative of ( )S t  and ( )y t  are zero. Hence, 
from (10) and (11) with ( ) 0S t =  and ( ) 0y t = , at steady state, we have: 
  
( ) ( )( )*
t
S t
y t
ψ ν
ψ β
−
=
+
 & ( )
0
1
*S t
R
=  ……… (12) 
 
Panel a      panel b 
Figure 1:  Phase Diagrams for Susceptible and Infected Individuals for a constant 
vaccination 
 
As can be inferred from the figure in panel a, at steady state there is an inverse 
relationship between ( )S t  and ( )y t . Beginning from ( ( ), ( )) 0f S t y t = , if ( )S t  
increases, equation (10) implies that ( )S t  deceases with time keeping ψ  and 
( )tν  constant. An increase in ( )tν shifts ( ( ), ( )) 0f S t y t =  inward and decrease 
shifts it upward. Panel b shows the relationship between fraction of people 
infected and susceptible from ( ( ), ( )) 0g S t y t = . From the balanced path, if ( )S t  
increases, ( ( ), ( ))g S t y t  implies that ( )y t  increases and if ( )S t  decreases, ( )y t  
decreases. 
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The S(t) intercept of ( ( ), ( )) 0f S t y t =  is less than one, 
namely ( ) ( ) ( )1t tS t ψ ν νψ ψ
−
= = −  with corresponding rate of vaccination given by 
(13). It is found by inserting ( )
0
1
*S t
R
=   to ( ) ( )( )*
t
S t
y t
ψ ν
ψ β
−
=
+
 and solving for v at 
the ( )S t -intercept of ( ( ), ( ))f S t y t .  
 
0
1
* 1v
R
ψ  = − 
 
……. (13) 
 
We can have at least two cases that happen in practice. The value of the 
S(t) intercept of ( ( ), ( )) 0f S t y t = may be greater than or less than the value of the 
S(t) intercept of ( ( ), ( )) 0g S t y t = . If vaccination is large enough to keep the 
S(t) intercept of ( ( ), ( )) 0f S t y t =  below the S(t) intercept of ( ( ), ( )) 0g S t y t = , then 
dynamics imply the possibility of eradication as can be seen from the figure 
below. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Phase Diagrams for Dynamics of Susceptible and Infected Individuals 
with Vaccination 
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The directional arrows in the above phase diagram show how the fraction of 
infected population develops over time. They imply that any vaccination rate 
greater than or equal to
0
11v
R
ψ  = − 
 
 ensures asymptotic eradication of the 
disease whether in initial point is in region I, or II, or III. If the initial point is in 
region I, the path moves down and when it hits the ( )
0
1
*S t
R
=  line decreases 
vertically to the second region. Once in the second region, for that matter for any 
initial point in the second region, the integral trajectories move to the direction of 
the origin ensuring the intersection of the trajectories with the 
line ( ) ( )( )*
t
S t
y t
ψ ν
ψ β
−
=
+
.  When any path hits the line it moves horizontally to the 
left and there after to the direction of North-left which imply that ( ) 0y t →  
as t → ∞ ! Hence with vaccination, it is biologically feasible to asymptotically 
eradicate disease following SIR model. In the previous section, it has been 
shown that when individuals optimize on their decision concerning disease, the 
biological feasibility can be accompanied by economic feasibility. 
 
If the fraction of vaccinated individuals is not big enough to keep the 
S(t) intercept of ( ( ), ( )) 0f S t y t =  below the S(t) intercept of ( ( ), ( )) 0g S t y t = , then 
the dynamics resembles the case without vaccination. 
When vaccination is zero, the ( )S t  intercept of ( ( ), ( )) 0f S t y t =  is 1 since 
( ) 0y t = while the ( )S t intercept of ( ( ), ( )) 0g S t y t =  is always below 1 since R0 is 
greater than one by assumption. Thus, the two phase diagrams intersect in one 
interior point with stable equilibrium of positive fraction of infected individuals. 
Practically the disease will not eradicate itself if there are no human preventive 
actions in operation. 
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Figure 3:  Phase Diagrams for Dynamics of Susceptible and Infected Individuals 
 
The equilibrium point ( ( ) ( )* , *S t y t ) is locally asymptotically stable as it satisfies 
Lyapunov’s condition for local stability. To see this, 
for 1 2
1 2
( * ( ), * ( )) ( * ( ), * ( ))
( * ( ), * ( )) ( * ( ), * ( ))
f S t y t f S t y t
J
g S t y t g S t y t
 
=  
 
, it is the case that 
1 2( * ( ), * ( )) ( * ( ), * ( )) 0f S t y t g S t y t+ <  and 0J >  which is sufficient for local 
stability. However, the equilibrium is not globally asymptotically stable since it 
doesn’t satisfy Olech’s theorem; i.e. 1 2'
1 2
( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( ))
( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( ))
f S t y t f S t y t
J
g S t y t g S t y t
 
=  
 
 ∀ ( ) 2S t +∈  and 
( ) 2y t +∈   the condition ' 0J >  and 1 2( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( )) 0f S t y t g S t y t+ <  is not satisfied. 
Public Health Policies 
Health outcomes are governed by the tools of health policy which include 
preventive tools such as sanitation and vaccination and curative tools, mainly 
treatment. Vaccination has attracted the attention of economists long ago as it 
involves public policy and externalities. The individual decision to vaccinate itself 
in an attempt to prevent oneself from illness, also benefits other individuals since 
vaccinated individuals will not transmit the disease any more. Unvaccinated 
individuals, on the other hand, will increase the likelihood of infection of the rest 
of population. Such an externality has diverse implication for individual decision 
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making and economic policy. In one way, it implies that the individual decision 
over vaccination is suboptimal compared with what is socially desirable. This 
idea was formally forwarded by Brito et al (1991) in a static framework. They 
showed that compulsory vaccination is inferior to market based, and both 
compulsory and market based vaccinations are below what a benevolent social 
planner would decide due to the existence of externalities.  
 
However, this view has been challenged by some authors. Francis (1997) has 
shown that there exists at least a condition under which the vaccination by the 
market outcome is socially optimal, and there exist no need for public 
interventions engendered by externalities in a dynamic setting. Rational epidemic 
also implies that individual’s response to preventive measures differs depending 
up on the fraction of susceptible population vaccinated. As a result, some people 
might not even prefer to get vaccinated or take preventive measures in general if 
the expected value of being caught by the disease is by far lower than the 
disutility they suffer from vaccination or any preventive measures12.  
 
Treatment has also been an important curative tool in health policy. However, 
compared with vaccination, there barely is research in economic epidemiology 
that considers treatments in health policy. The two researches we have so far, 
Goldman and Lightwood (2002) and Gersovitz and Hammer (2004), have 
investigated the importance of treatment for control and eradication of diseases. 
Policy Options 
With the policy tools at hand and the relative effect of disease, policy makers 
may resort to do nothing, control, elimination, eradication or extinctions of 
diseases. Doing nothing might be preferable when the disease resulted in 
insignificant fraction of infected people.  When doing nothing, the whole 
dynamics of the SIR model without intervention applies. As a result, the planner 
                                                      
12  See Geoffard and Philipson (1997), Philipson (2000), Kessing and Robert (2002), Gersovitz 
(2003), Gersovitz and Hammer (2003) and Gersovitz and Hammer (2004) for further and detailed 
considerations of these issues. 
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is left with ( ) ( )0* 1y t Rψβ= −  and 0
1
*( )S t
R
=  of fraction of infected and 
susceptible individuals. We take the above steady state values to be initial values 
for any intervention. 
 
Control 
One of the policy options that require interventions is control of disease. Control 
of disease involves reducing the prevalence, incidence, of and morbidity due to a 
disease to an acceptable proportion as a result of deliberate action. For instance, 
diarrhea diseases are controlled in many countries. Another option than control is 
elimination of the disease and infections. A disease is eliminated when the 
incidence of the specific disease reduced to zero proportion as a result of 
deliberate action in a given geographical area. For instance, Neonatal tetanus is 
the case in point. However, elimination of diseases is quite different from 
elimination of infections. Elimination of infections involves reducing the incidence 
of infections by a specific agent to zero proportion in a specific geographical 
location engendered by intentional public action.  In case of elimination of 
infections, continued cares need to be taken to avoid reestablishment of 
transmission. In Yemen, for example, poliomyelitis incidence was almost 
eliminated but has recently been reemerged back from Nigeria. In all the above 
three cases, continued intervention measures are required so as to prevent the 
reemergence of the disease outbreak.  
 
There are number candidate paths of vaccination for control. Some of the paths 
involve control over the short run and simultaneously aim at asymptotic 
eradication.  On the other hand, the rest of the control measure aim at reducing 
the fraction of infected people at “reasonable” positive value. This involves 
persistent vaccination effort and doesn’t lead to long run eradication. The critical 
proportion of vaccination that ensures asymptotic eradication is implied in the 
dynamics of the SIR model. Any vaccination constant at a value greater than or 
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equal to
0
11v
R
ψ  = − 
 
, see equation 13,  results in asymptotic eradication while 
below it results in reduced fraction of infected people but requires persistent 
control. Of all constant vaccination, the smallest vaccination that ensures 
asymptotic eradication is
0
11v
R
ψ  = − 
 
. However, Anderson and May (1991) 
argue that the likely value is to continue vaccinating the new bornψ , since it is 
assumed to be harder to vaccinate adults.  
 
Depending on social preference, the planner may aim at persistent control 
without asymptotic eradication or control aimed at asymptotic eradication. In 
figure (4), the dotted vertical lines represent the fraction of infected people 
without vaccination and with vaccination. In this figure, post vaccination dynamics 
is the same as that of pre-vaccination dynamics. On the other hand, the 
dynamics in figure (5) shows that the trajectory pre vaccination is different from 
that of post vaccination. In figure (5), since ( ( ), ( )) 0f S t y t =  curve sufficiently 
shifts inward, asymptotic eradication is guaranteed. 
 
  
Figure 4:  Phase Diagrams for Dynamics of Susceptible and Infected Individuals 
with persistent control 
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Figure 5:  Phase Diagrams for Dynamics of Susceptible and Infected Individuals 
with control aimed at asymptotic eradication. 
 
 
Eradication and Extinction 
The two cases in which continuous preventions are no more required are 
eradication and extinction of diseases. As the name implies, eradication of a 
disease is achieved when the incidence of infection caused by specific agent is 
permanently reduced to zero proportion world wide. The global success story in 
eradication is smallpox. It took the world about ten years to eradicate smallpox. 
However, smallpox has not reached the state of extinction. A stage of extinction 
is reached when the specific agent of disease no longer exists in laboratory or 
nature. In fact, no disease has ever reached the state of extinction so far.  
 
As eradication is a global public good, it requires strong coordination among 
nation states. Barrett (2003) has shown the conditions under which control and 
eradication of diseases are Nash equilibrium in a static framework. He argued 
that it may not be beneficial to eliminate disease unilaterally unless every other 
country eliminates. Or it may not be beneficiary for a last country to eradicate, 
though globally beneficiary, once every other nation has eradicated the disease. 
Depending on the conditions, global disease eradication may be a coordination 
game or prisoners’ dilemma game. In the former case, eradication is more 
 22
plausible than the latter case of globally inefficient equilibrium. In the prisoner’s 
dilemma equilibrium, each country resorts to control of disease through 
vaccination. 
 
Since control and elimination of diseases and infections involve perpetual 
measures of control in general and in some cases vaccination, they involve 
unending costs. In addition to the cost of manufacturing and administering 
vaccination, there is a cost associated with the vaccine as there are some 
reactions to vaccines and distortions in consumption and production of 
exposures. However, once disease is eradicated, there is no more cost required 
due to vaccines and the disease; though it involves higher costs in the short run. 
As a result, there is unshrinking sustainable pie from eradication of disease 
compared with control due to cost savings. Moreover, there is also welfare gain 
from eradication caused by removal of disease induced distortions13. The pie may 
not be recognized once the disease disappeared as no one cares about smallpox 
now; but, its existence entails huge cost and diversion of resources as can be 
exemplified from the pandemic of AIDS.  
 
Some examples are helpful at this point. For instance, assuming three percent of 
discount rate, BH reported that the benefit to cost ratio has been about 450:1 to 
the world while US alone benefited about $5 billion from eradication of smallpox. 
For the case of poliomyelitis, BH reported that it exceeds $900 per disability life 
year. Micro proportion evidence by Kim et al (1997) shown that the existence of 
Onchocerciasis in Teppi coffee plantation in Ethiopia decreased daily wage by 
16% on average and labor supply by 4%. 
 
Concerning the candidates for eradication, Barrett (2004) suggested that 
diseases that are already eliminated from rich nations are prime candidates. 
Globally, diseases such as malaria, poliomyelitis, measles, mums, 
                                                      
13 This point is clearly analyzed by Philipson (1995). According to this line of research, disease is 
considered as random tax on exposure and cost of illness covers only minor part of the welfare 
loss due to diseases. 
 23
dracunculiasis/Guinea worm, lymphatic filariasis, onchocerciasis/river blindness, 
chaga’s disease, hansen’s disease/leprosy, rubella, cysticecosis, and Sars are 
suggested to be eradicated as they have been eliminated from rich countries. 
Though there has been an effort to eradicate smallpox, measles, polio, and 
bovine tuberculosis globally, all of them except smallpox are not achieved so far. 
For instance, Sachs (2002) pointed out that global effort to eradicate malaria had 
begun 1955 and ended in 1960s and regarded as failure. 
 
There have been a number of studies investigating why global disease 
eradication has failed for diseases tried so far such as measles, and bovine 
tuberculosis. Biological feasibility is precondition for elimination and eradication 
of diseases. Alyward et al (2000) and Nelson (1999) pointed out that eradication 
is a function of economic viability, biological capability, and social and political 
feasibility. The availability of effective vaccine and/or treatment, absence of non-
human reservoirs, and the existence of practical diagnostic tools that single out 
the proportion and extent of infection that lead to transmission of the disease are 
the key factors determining biological feasibility. In this paper, we will focus on 
those diseases that are biologically feasible to be eradicated and concentrate on 
their economic optimality. 
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IV. Optimal Disease Eradication in Dynamic Framework 
In this section, we compare the different health policy options we described 
earlier. As the crux under consideration is the dynamic benefit of disease 
eradication, the natural point to begin the analysis is on endemic epidemiological 
model.  
 
The dynamics of disease predicted by rational epidemics is different from 
biological models. Biological models assume that behavior is prevalence 
inelastic. As a result, the probability of getting infected by an agent increases with 
prevalence of diseases. That is as more people are infected, there is more 
chance for the susceptible agents to get infection.  However, if infection of an 
agent behavior is dependent, further consideration shows that such a result 
doesn’t hold any more.  
 
Most of the infectious diseases transmit through human actions. As the 
prevalence of a given disease increases, a rational agent resorts to protective 
measures by changing her behavior. Protection may involve vaccination for 
vaccine preventable diseases such as polio or measles. It may also be resorting 
to safe sex when the prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases increases, or 
getting the environment clean on the outbreak of cholera, etc. Such a protective 
behavior decreases the rate at which infection increases. Again behavioral 
response implies that agents may shun away from taking protective measures as 
new infection cases stop giving more chance for prevalence to increase at higher 
rate. Hence, a rational epidemic implies that the likelihood of transmission of 
diseases is no more constant under prevalence elastic behavior. 
 
There are a number of options to eradicate diseases given the biological 
feasibility is satisfied. One way, which was described before, is to aim at 
asymptotic eradication. As the time of eradication approaches very large, 
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practically infinity, the pie from eradication diminishes. The pie from eradication is 
sizable if the disease is eradicated as quickly as possible.   
 
In fact, there have been some attempts made in the literature to address this 
point before. For instance Barrett and Hoel (2003) have tried to explicitly address 
the problem. However, this paper is different from Barrett and Hoel’s in the 
following respect. 
 
Barrett and Hoel’s simplify the biological dynamics of disease transmission as by 
a single differential equation in which instantaneous rate of force of infection per 
unit of time is proportional to the deviations from the steady state force of 
infection. Since this simplification involves epidemiological disease transmission 
mechanism, the simplification does not have any biological motivations. Since 
such an approximation to steady state needs biological justification, we propose 
a different way to tackle the problem that does not involve such difficulty of 
biological interpretation.  
 
Here we follow an alternative approach to address this problem. We take (10) 
and (11) without any simplification and assume they hold for ( )y t ε> , where 
epsilon is assumed to be very small number serving as critical or tipping point. 
Once the tipping point is achieved; i.e. ( )y t ε= , the disease disappears quickly in 
its own mechanism without any more vaccination or social intervention. Hence, 
our results are not restricted to temporary deviations from steady state.  
 
Equation (11) implies that eradicating as quick as possible involves two stages of 
processes. The first stage involves reducing the fraction of population that would 
have been susceptible with doing nothing to zero.  The second stage involves 
reducing the fraction of infected population from 0( )y t y=  to ( )y T ε= . But this 
can not practically be instantaneously. It is a gradual process that follows from 
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the dynamics of the fraction of individuals infected, once the fraction of 
susceptible population is reduced zero. 
 
The common approach to measure the welfare cost of diseases is to take the 
cost of illness.  According to this measure, higher morbidity inducing disease has 
a higher welfare loss14.Then the welfare optimization problem is to maximize the 
objective function given the discount rate of ρ  is 
 
0
[ ( ) ( )]
T
tW e v t by t dtρ ω−= − −∫ … (14) 
 
( )by t represents the cost at time t of having a fraction ( )y t  of the population 
infected, and ( )v tω 15 is the cost of vaccinating a proportion ( )v t of persons per 
unit of time (e.g., per year). T is the length of the vaccination program, which may 
be finite or infinite.  
 
Note that the cost ( )v tω includes more than just the costs of the vaccination 
process and production of vaccines. In addition it includes costs related to side 
effects of vaccination. Moreover we also have additional constraints given below.  
 
( ) 0v t ≥ … (15) 
                                                      
14 Philipson (1995) presented, on the other hand, an alternative measure considering prevalence 
elastic behavior. According to this measure, disease is regarded as a stochastic tax on 
consumption of exposure. The prime case in point is AIDS. The price of sex consumption 
increases as the random tax on exposure, the incidence of the disease, increases. As the welfare 
loss of taxes is greater than their revenue effect, the overall welfare loss of diseases is greater 
than cost of illness. For a preliminary analyses and point of departure, we begin our analysis of 
welfare cost with cost of illness only. 
 
15 More general cost function would be strictly increasing and convex. Without any simplification, 
it is not obvious how to proceed. One inevitably faces system of four non-linear differential 
equations with five variables which would make the task of extracting conditions for optimality of 
eradication difficult. 
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Further more, we assume the initial proportion of infected individuals is given by 
steady state proportion with zero vaccination. This assumption looks reasonable 
as the steady state is locally stable once the human intervention through 
vaccination is kept to zero. That is, we have: 
 
( ) 0S t ≥ ,
0
1(0)S
R
=  ∧  ( )0 0(0) 1y y Rψ εβ= = − >
16… (16) 
 
( )y T ε= 17 … (17) 
 
Then the economic optimization, the social planner’s problem is to maximize (14) 
subject to (10), (11), (15), (16), and (17).   
 
Here instead of directly going for full fledged control problem, we compare doing 
nothing with eradicate as fast as possible18. Let 0w  be the welfare from doing 
nothing. It is achieved by keeping vaccination to zero and having consequent 
fraction of people infected. If the planner decides to do nothing infinitely in the 
future 0w , is given by:   
 
( )0 0 00
0
( 1)t by b Rw e by dtρ ψ
ρ βρ
∞
−
−
= − = − = −∫  … (18) 
Note that the above equation is identical to BH’s (C-1). 
 
                                                      
16 These initial values are the values that would have been steady state value had there not 
been intervention by vaccinating people.  
17Indeed keeping the terminal value of the fraction of individuals infected to zero doesn’t 
qualitatively alter the results in the paper but it doesn’t logically follow from our model. 
With ( ) 0S t = , equation (11) reduces to ( ) ( )0( 1) tRy t e δ ψψ β
− +−
=  unless
0ψ =
  
18  Actually directly solving the control problem leads to “bang-bang” solution type which is 
qualitatively identical to the result presented here. 
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Fastest eradication, as implied in figure (2) or equation (11), is achieved in two 
stages assuming that there is no upper limit on ( )v t . First the proportion of 
susceptible individuals has to be reduced zero. All susceptible should be 
vaccinated, and then the newborns should be vaccinated for some time until the 
proportion of infected individuals decreases to from initial state to epsilon. The 
cost of reducing the susceptible to zero is immediately is given by
0R
ω
, which is 
per unit of cost of vaccination ω  multiplied by the initial fraction of 
susceptible
0
1
R
. With the fraction susceptible reduced to zero, the proportion of 
infected people evolves according to the differential equation (11) with ( ) 0S t = . 
This is given by: 
( ) ( )0 ty t y e δ ψ− += ……….. (19) 
 
Thus, the welfare from eradication of as fast as possible, which is obtained by 
first keeping ( ) 0S t = and then vaccinating the newborns till T, is achieved. It is 
given by, ( ) ( )
0 0
T
tt by t e dt
R
ρω ων −− − +  ∫ , inserting (19) and keeping ( )v t ψ=  it 
reduces  to: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )01 0
1
1 exp( ) 1 expb Rw T T
R
ψω ωψ ρ ψ δ ρ
ρ β ψ δ ρ
−
= − − − − − − − + +
+ +
… (20) 
 
Assuming epsilon equals to some fraction of the initial proportion of people 
infected, say 0kyε = , by substituting epsilon to (19), we have 
( )
0 0
Tky y e δ ψ− +=  and 
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the time of eradication ( )
ln kT
ψ δ= − +
19.  Substituting the value of T in to (20), we 
have  
 
( )
( )
01
0
1
1 1
b R
w k k
R
ρ ρ δ ψ
δ ψ δ ψψω ωψ
ρ β ψ δ ρ
+ +
+ +
   
−
= − − − − −      + +   
 … (21) 
 
When k=1, it is easy to see that the last two terms of equation (21) vanish and we 
remain with 1
0
w
R
ω
= −  which is exactly equal to BH’s equation (C-6) when 
relevant parameters are substituted.  
 
Moreover, immediate eradication is preferred to doing nothing when 
1 0w w> ⇔ (21) > (18). Equivalently after substituting (9) and some algebra, we 
have: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
0
0
1
1
1
k
R
b
R k
ψ δ ρ
ρ
ρ
δ ψ
ψ δ ρ ρ
ψω
ψ δ ρ ψ δ
ρ ψ
+ +
+
  
  + + − −
  
−  <  
+ + +   
 + −     
 ….. (22) 
 
Equation (22) is our decision/cost benefit rule for eradication. Economic 
interpretation of (22) is hindered by nuisance combinations of parameters.  
 
Alternatively, from (22), we can calculate the critical value of the welfare cost of 
the disease, b, which is the cost which will make the planner indifferent between 
doing nothing and aiming at “eradicating as quick as possible”, i.e. 
                                                      
19  
( )0,1T k+∈ ⇐ ∈ Epsilon should be lesser than initial proportion of infected and this 
necessitates the value k to belong between zero and one exclusive. 
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( ) ( ){ }1 0c
b
b w wArg
+∈
= • = •

where •  represents respective parameters of each 
equations.  This critical value of b depends on k, so we write ( )cb k , which follows 
from (22): 
 
 
( )( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
0
0
1
( )
1
1
c
R k
b k
R
k
ρ
δ ψ
ψ δ ρ
ρ
ρ ψ
ω ψ δ ρ ψ δ
ψ
ψ δ ρ ρ
+
+ +
  
  + −
  + + +  
=  
−   
 + + − −     
 ….. (23) 
 
The cutoff/critical b in (23) determines our cost benefit rule.  As mentioned 
above, (23) equals to CBHb  for k=1. 
 
( )
( )0(1) 1
cb
R
ω ψ δ ρ
ψ
+
=
−
 ….. (24) 
 
Equation (24) is equivalent of Barrett and Hoel’s equation (25) when relevant 
parameters are substituted. 
 
When epsilon gets closer to zero, i.e. when 0k → , our model gets closer to 
Anderson and May (1991)’s in which eradication becomes more and more 
difficult. As the limit of k=0 eradication is only possible asymptotically, and  
 
 
( )
( )
0
0
( )(0)
1
c
R
b
R
ω ψ δ ρ ρ ψ
ψ
+ + +
=
−
 ….. (25) 
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Since ( )cb k  is declining in k, the ratio between the highest and lowest possible 
ratio of the critical value of k is 
 
( ) 0( )(0)
(1) ( )
c
c
Rb
b
ψ δ ρ ρ ψ
ψ δ ρ
+ + +
=
+
 ….. (26) 
 
In the general case of 0<k<1, eradicating as fast as possible is preferable to 
doing nothing provided the cost of infection is greater than the critical value given 
by ( )cb k . This critical value is higher than the critical value reported by Barrett and 
Hoel in their equation (25). The difference between the result reported here and 
that of Barrett and Hoel emanates from differences in 1w . In their case, the cost of 
eradication is the cost of instantaneously reducing all the susceptible to zero. In 
our case, here however, there is more cost. We need to vaccinate the newborns 
till the proportion of infected individuals reduces to epsilon. Hence in our 
analysis, we have an additional sum of costs, namely the discounted cost of 
vaccinating the newborns plus the discounted cost of infection of the initially 
infected fraction (see also the discussion after (21)).  Generally, equation (23) 
above provides higher cutoff b than Barrett and Hoel’s.  
 
In essence, our cost benefit rule is stronger. At least for the case of polio, 
approximating (10) and (11) by single equation that specifies the dynamics as 
deviation from locally asymptotically stable steady state significantly 
underestimates the value of “b” as 0k → . Thus, Barrett and Hoel’s simplification 
of the dynamics quantitatively affects the magnitude of results in the linear cost 
function. Let us briefly apply the result to the eradication of polio below and 
compare whether the difference is significant numerically for polio. 
 
APPLICATION TO POLIO 
Currently massive effort is being exerted to eradicate polio and dracunculiasis. In 
this section we will try to match the results of our model to eradication of polio. 
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The question is, then, whether (22) holds for polio for different values of k.  To 
make comparisons, I will use the data used by Barrett and Hoel (2003). 
 
There are two vaccines available in the market, OPV and IPV.  Barrett and Hoel 
(2003) report that the marginal cost of OPV are $46 in rich and $4.88 in poor 
countries for complete immunity while that of IPV is around $62 in rich and $25 in 
poor countries.  These give the estimates of ω  in poor and rich countries.  
 
Moreover, the value of  ψ  is estimated to be 3% or poor countries and 1% in rich 
countries. We assume ρ  to be 3%.  The other parameter we need to have is the 
recovery rateδ . The infectious period of polio is about 20 days and δ  is 
approximately the inverse of this duration period times 364.25 to express δ  per 
year (δ =18.21) like the other parameters.  
 
It is far difficult to have exact value of b since it amounts to the welfare cost of 
paralytic polio.  Khan and Ehreth (2003) reported estimated cost of medical care 
only. It equals to $25,000 and $420 in rich and poor countries respectively. 
Instead in this section we use the cutoff value for value of b on (23), for different 
values of k, and compare it with the average value reported by Khan and Ehreth 
(2003). However, WHO (2002) reported the relative frequency of paralysis is 
0.005, i.e., 1 out of 200 suffer paralysis. This implies the value of b to be 0.005 
times the cost of single case of polio paralysis. With these, the cutoff values, 
which are determined by (23) and for different values of k, for both vaccine 
options are reported below. 
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Table 1:  The cutoff Values of b for Polio using OPV and IPV for Rich and Poor 
Nations 
 
It is obvious that when 0k → , the critical value of b increases. From the results in 
the table, eradication of polio is not an optimal deal for both rich and poor in the 
relevant domain of k. As it was shown in foot note 19, in our model k can’t be 
zero or one. Hence the critical values at k=1 and k=0 give the lower and the 
upper boundaries for the critical welfare cost of polio. This result is qualitatively 
consistent with Barrett and Hoel (2004) and different from Bart et al (1996) and 
Kahn and Ehreth (2003). 
 
OPV IPV k 
Rich countries Poor countries Rich countries Poor countries 
1 100,574 3,560 135,557 18,240 
BH’s 100,795 3,568 135,854 18,280 
0.1 101,502 3,647 136,808 18,684 
0.01 102,262 3,728 137,831 19,097 
0.001 103,019 3,808 138,851 19,508 
0.0001 103,772 3,888 139,867 19,918 
0.00001 104,523 3,986 140,879 20,326 
0.000001 105,271 4,047 141,888 20,733 
0.0000001 106,017 4,126 142,892 21,138 
0 302,220 24,964 407,340 127,890 
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 VI. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper an attempt has been made to single out the conditions for 
eradication of infectious diseases in simplest framework. For those diseases 
following SIR framework, it is possible to eradicate diseases asymptotically. 
Moreover, when eradication is feasible, it is optimal to eradicate diseases when 
the critical cost of infection is lower than the cost of infection. It has been also 
checked that eradication of polio is not economically optimal using IPV or OPV.  
 
 The results of the model can be extended in various ways. One obvious 
limitation of the analysis here is it assumes constant vaccination effort. More 
fruitful analysis is to consider variable vaccination effort in the process of control 
and eradication.  
 
Moreover, the analysis here considers the world as if it is one country. If we relax 
this assumption and consider interactions among countries, we can gain more 
insight.  In addition to these, we assumed that vaccines can be supplied as they 
are required. However, we are totally abstracting from monopoly rent of vaccines 
patents, and complete loss of income for monopolist from the vaccine once the 
disease eradicated. Surely such interaction shapes the control we have over 
vaccination and the path of eradication. 
 
The other more difficult extension in this framework can be made with the cost 
function. Here we assumed positive and constant marginal costs. But, if marginal 
costs are allowed to vary with the level of vaccination effort, it is not possible to 
accommodate the biological dynamics of SIR model. The fruitful direction to 
solve this problem is to consider discrete time formulation of the problem and go 
for numerical solutions. 
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